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Abstract
The social brain contains distinct networks for mentalizing as
well as for mirroring-based action observation. We present
work towards a model of how these two systems may interact
during embodied communication. The model connects a men-
talizing system for attributing and inferring different orders of
belief about own and other’s mental states, with a hierarchical
predictive model for online action perception and production.
We discuss interactions between both systems and describe
simulation experiments in which two agents equipped with this
model engage in embodied communication. Results demon-
strate how mentalizing affords higher robustness of communi-
cation by enabling interactive grounding processes.
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Introduction
A growing body of research has started to study the cogni-
tive mechanisms of social interaction and communication in
humans. Two partially overlapping networks have been iden-
tified in the “social brain” (Van Overwalle, 2009): an ac-
tion observation system for perceiving and recognizing oth-
ers’ behavioral cues, and a mentalizing system for under-
standing others in terms of attributed mental states or theory
of mind (ToM). Both systems have been studied a lot sep-
arately. Action observation is nowadays widely assumed to
rest upon principles of prediction-based processing (A. Clark,
2013). This means that predictions about expected sensory
stimuli (either caused by an observed stimuli or through
self-generated action) are continuously formed and evaluated
against incoming sensory input to determine a prediction er-
ror that informs further processing. A core mechanism to de-
rive such predictions are covert simulations of the observed
behavior, based on own sensorimotor action representations
that are assumed to be shared between perception processes
and action production processes. This is what is also re-
ferred to as mirroring in behavior perception. The principle
of prediction-based processing has also been argued to ac-
count for language production and comprehension (Pickering
& Garrod, 2013) or the social brain more generally (Frith &
Frith, 2010).
Yet, what is less clear is the full picture of how the mental-
izing system and the mirroring system work together: How
does behavior perception change when a behavior is assumed
to be “for me”, i.e., intended to be socially meaningful? How
are perception-action couplings modulated by social interac-
tion and mentalizing? How do these processes enable coor-
dination devices in communication like feedback, joint atten-
tion, or grounding?
While a number of mechanisms have been hypothesized,
these questions are far from being answered. What is
undisputed is that interacting with other agents assumed to
be “intentional” is fundamentally different from interact-
ing with non-intentional things or objects (Gangopadhyay &
Schilbach, 2012). That is, intentionality-attribution and un-
derlying mentalizing influence sensory processing to become
“social perception” (Wykowska, Wiese, Prosser, & Mu¨ller,
2014; Teufel, Fletcher, & Davis, 2010). A key component to
trigger this intentional stance is social attention, most promi-
nently signaled through gaze (Teufel et al., 2010). For ex-
ample, Ciaramidaro, Becchio, Colle, Bara, and Walter (2014)
recently found that social gaze leads to the attribution of com-
municative intent, which in turn differentially recruits the
mirror neuron system and mentalizing system networks in
processing the behavior of the (now considered) interlocutor.
Clearly, these processes play an important role not only in the
solitary observation events in which they have been studied
mostly so far, but even more so in continuous online interac-
tion (Myllyneva & Hietanen, 2015; Schilbach et al., 2013).
In this paper, we present work towards a model of how
a mentalizing system interacts with a mirroring-based action
observation system in continuous online interaction. In the
remainder of this paper, we first review related modeling at-
tempts and then present an integrated model that formalizes
the two systems in terms of computational processes, as well
as their roles and dynamic interplay in inter-agent communi-
cation. We report results from simulations of embodied com-
munication with hand gesture, gaze, and head nods/shakes,
between two virtual agents each of which equipped with the
integrated model. We analyze how different abilities for
mentalizing enable increasingly complex social coordination,
from mere mimicry to eventually shared understanding.
Related work
So far there have only been few attempts to combine mental-
izing, perception and action control in dynamic social inter-
action. In their MOSAIC model, Wolpert, Doya, and Kawato
(2003) underline that a true communicative model needs to
close the communicative loop and must be perceptive to the
observer’s responses and ultimately her understanding. In
their model, a hierarchy of paired forward and inverse models
is hypothesized as a basic mechanism for processing move-
ment as well as beliefs or intentions. Sadeghipour and Kopp
(2011) present the Empirical Bayesian Belief Update model
(EBBU), a probabilistic model that implements a mirroring-
based account of the perception and production of iconic ges-
tures. In this model, a hierarchically organized representation
of motor knowledge is used during action perception by for-
ward models that formulate probabilistic expectations about
possible continuations of the observed gesture. The same rep-
resentation is used for action generation, with probabilistic
interactions between both processes to model e.g. priming
and resonance effects, and it is expanded by way of inverse
models when an unknown action is encountered.
A Bayesian approach to modeling intention inference is
presented by Diaconescu et al. (2014). They apply a hier-
archical Gaussian filter approach to learn the intentionality of
others through updating the beliefs about others’ intentions
during an interaction game. This framework captures indi-
vidual social learning differences in order to predict the par-
ticipants’ perspective-taking abilities and trustworthiness. A
similarly effective approach to modeling a mentalizing mod-
ule was implemented by Devaine, Hollard, and Daunizeau
(2014), who applied it to a gambling game scenario. Partici-
pants had to play against a Bayesian mentalizing model that
could employ several levels of ToM belief attributions, from
zero up to a third-order ToM. Results show that only partici-
pants who were framed to apply ToM could beat the Bayesian
mentalizing model.
Few attempts have been made to clarify the interaction be-
tween mentalizing and mirroring. A meta-analysis of studies
on mentalizing found that mirror areas are not recruited un-
less the task involves inferencing intentionality from action
stimuli (Van Overwalle, 2009). Teufel et al. (2010) present
the “Perceptual Mentalizing Model” which focuses on the in-
fluence of the mentalizing system on the mirror system via
perceptual processing in the STS area. They differentiate be-
tween explicit and implicit theory of mind (what we call here
mentalizing and mirroring, respectively) and associate the ar-
eas mPFC and TPJ to the former and the mirror neuron sys-
tem to the later kind of ToM processing. Importantly, both
kinds of ToM are assumed to be influenced by social sen-
sory processing. Explicit ToM processes are associated with
processing of the intentionality of a movement and have a
strong influence on area STS, which acts as a gating mech-
anism to increase or decrease perception-action coupling in
implicit ToM processing.
Wykowska et al. (2014) present a model of social atten-
tion, the “Intentional Stance Model”, according to which the
mentalizing system either exhibits a design stance or an inten-
tional stance. The latter would be exhibited towards agents to
whom mental states are attributed, while the former is applied
to objects without intentionality attribution. Again, mentaliz-
ing is also associated to areas mPFC and TPJ, while social
sensory processing is associated to area STS. The mentaliz-
ing system is assumed to influence sensory processing in a
top-down fashion, but also to affect sensory gain control in
attention mechanisms. They report the sensory gain manip-
ulation for attentional reorienting mechanisms to be stronger
in the intentional stance than in the design stance. A key as-
pect in triggering this intentional stance seems to be social
gaze, which has been found to lead to the attribution of com-
municative intent (Ciaramidaro et al., 2014), which in turn
differentially recruits the mirroring and mentalizing system
networks in processing the behavior of the interlocutor.
Towards an integrated model
In this paper we present a novel model of how a predictive
sensorimotor subsystem for action observation and produc-
tion is coupled with a mentalizing subsystem for attributing
mental states, to enable situated communication between em-
bodied agents. To that end, and as described below, we embed
the models in virtual agents and let them interact nonverbally
to test how communicative coordination emerges from the in-
terplay between the two subsystems (see Fig. 1).
We base our modeling approach on a number of assump-
tions: First, we define successful communication to be a pro-
cess leading into shared communicative intentionality and es-
tablished perceptual or conceptual common ground between
the participants (Tomasello, 2008). This state is achieved in a
dynamic grounding process (H. H. Clark & Brennan, 1991),
in which communicating agents mutually present and coordi-
nate their subjectively held beliefs about each other as well
as the state of the interaction. Second, mentalizing plays a
pivotal role in this through facilitating information integra-
tion and self-other distinction for coordinated action. It re-
ceives information from, and affects the mirroring subsys-
tem, which itself processes perceived action in an immedi-
ate fashion and feeds into higher-level mentalizing. Third,
we assume that coordinated action in communication highly
depends on the order of ToM realized by the mentalizing sub-
system. 2nd order reasoning, i.e. beliefs about other-beliefs,
is minimally necessary for any cooperative behavior that goes
beyond accidental coordination. Finally, gaze plays a special
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Figure 1: Outline of the overall structure of the simulated
communication between two cognitive embodied agents.
role in signaling and regulating social attention and commu-
nicative intent. Mirror areas were found to be recruited es-
pecially when intentional action is expected (Van Overwalle,
2009) and one indicator for communicative intention is social
gaze (Ciaramidaro et al., 2014). We hence assume that gaze
triggers mentalizing and thus also mirroring activity. Staying
within the confines of the nonverbal domain, we also include
head-nods and head-shakes as feedback signals for agreement
and disagreement.
Mentalizing subsystem
The mentalizing subsystem is a model of an agent’s subjec-
tive ToM, which processes definite information about itself
and needs to infer others’ mental states from perceptual input.
A detailed depiction of the mentalizing subsystem is given in
Figure 2, which we will refer to and describe in more detail
in the Simulation results section. In its current version, the
subsystem utilizes a rather simple set of inference heuristics
to model how mental state attributions arise and change in
social interaction. In detail, this mentalizing model consists
of three sets of mental state attributes for different orders of
ToM reasoning: Beliefs held about mental states of myself
(me) or the interlocutor (you) constitute what we call 1st or-
der ToM. In pursuit of a minimal cognitive model of mental-
izing, we assume that only one order of ToM higher is needed
for what we want to model. In contrast to the classical recur-
sively nested beliefs (beliefs about beliefs about...), however,
we stipulate these beliefs to be held about mental states that
both interlocutors have in common (we). This is what we call
2nd-order ToM. Generally, mental states consist of beliefs,
desires, and intentions. The functional role that we ascribe to
2nd order ToM is to keep track of common ground, the desire
to agree, and the collaborative state of communication more
generally.
Mirroring subsystem
We adopt the Empirical Bayesian Belief Update model
(EBBU) (Sadeghipour & Kopp, 2011) for action observa-
tion and production. It implements a probabilistic hierar-
chical representation of sensorimotor knowledge about iconic
gestures, along with basic prediction, evaluation and activa-
tion processes that are used both in perception and genera-
tion of gestures. On the lowest level motor commands are
stored that represent single movement segments in time and
space. Hand trajectories are given as directed graphs with
their edges representing the motor commands. On the inter-
mediate level, motor programs represent paths in the motor
command graph. In that way each motor program stands for a
meaningful movement. The highest level of abstraction stores
motor schemas that cluster similar motor programs to rep-
resent functional equivalence classes (e.g. depicting similar
shapes). When observing a gesture trajectory, probabilistic
forward models predict expectations about possible continua-
tions of the observed gesture by running internal simulations
on all levels of the hierarchy in parallel. While simulating,
the hierarchical motor knowledge structure “resonates” to the
observed gesture performance. In each time step, the model’s
predictions are compared to the actual perception in order to
evaluate the corresponding motor commands, programs, or
schemas. When no corresponding representation of the ob-
served behavior can be found in the knowledge structure, in-
verse models can execute a motor learning mechanism that
imparts the novel behavior into the motor command graph
and corresponding motor program and schema, when no sim-
ilar schema exists.
Our model of a sensorimotor subsystem employs this
EBBU model and is equipped with knowledge about
schemas, programs and commands of different gesture tra-
jectories for ‘circle’, ‘square’, ‘surface’ and ‘waving’. Those
were learned from real human motion data. Single motor pro-
grams for a schema can take up to five seconds to produce,
with motor commands being activated every tenth of a sec-
ond. For every new observation of a hand trajectory entering
the subsystem, posterior probability distributions are updated
using the EBBU rule (Sadeghipour & Kopp, 2011). The top-
most level distributions about motor schemas are taken as a
proxy for a gesture’s meaning, and are linked to 1st order
mental state attributes in the mentalizig subsystem.
Integration and interplay
Our goal is to integrate mentalizing with mirroring-based ac-
tion perception to account for how behavior and mental states
arise and interact dynamically in a communicative interac-
tion.
In other models of mentalizing (Teufel et al., 2010;
Wykowska et al., 2014), the detection of social gaze plays
a crucial role. In our model, it triggers an inference for com-
municative intent to the gazing agent, which in turn affects
further processing of its behavior. In particular, as long as
the intention to communicate can be inferred, for any ob-
served gesture processed by the mirroring subsystem, the
most likely motor schema hypothesis is immediately pro-
jected into the mentalizing subsystem where it forms a men-
tal state attributed as a you-belief. This resembles the gating
mechanism of area STS as suggested by Teufel et al. (2010).
Correspondingly, a me-belief would cause the mirroring sub-
system to recruit the intended motor schema for production.
The current version of the mirroring subsystem is only capa-
ble of processing hand gestures; gaze and head movements
are thus directly asserted to the mentalizing subsystem.
Depending on the degree of ToM available in the agent’s
mentalizing subsystem, communicative intent can trigger an
inferred desire to reach mutual agreement about the under-
standing of the produced gesture. This is assessed by apply-
ing a threshold for good-enough understanding to the like-
lihood of beliefs about mental states of me and you (1st or-
der ToM). Note, however, when this threshold is exceeded
the producer agent still cannot be certain about the correct
understanding in the recipient unless sufficient feedback is
provided. Here, we require at least one correct reproduction
of the gesture. Further, head-shake and head-nod signals are
employed for meta-communication and can either increase or
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Figure 2: Attributes and inference heuristics in the mentalizing subsystem applied during different phases of the interaction.
The basis for complex inference is “Communicative Intention”, inferred from social gaze. The “Communicator” agent enters
the “Presentation Phase”, followed by an “Acceptance Phase” of interactive grounding, where higher order mental attributions
are needed for both agents to reach “Agreement”.
decrease confidence in the respective you-belief.
Simulation results
In order to test the model in online interactions we im-
plemented the model and ran simulations with two virtual
agents, each of which equipped with its own integrated
model. At the start of the simulation, both agents only have
a predefined set of mental states about themselves. They
can communicate using four gestures (‘circle’, ‘square’, ‘sur-
face’, and ‘waving’) that are perceived and generated as 3D
hand trajectories, as well as head nods/shakes that are trans-
ferred as simple timed key-value pairs. Gestures are pro-
duced with a configured amount of white noise, normalized
to the maximum movement vectors in the motor schema, so
that 10% noise reflect only a small amount of deviation dur-
ing gesturing. The amount of noise, the ability for 2nd or-
der ToM, and the good-enough threshold for minimal confi-
dence in observing a gesture are the independent variables to
parametrize the simulation.
We ran six simulation setups: 10%/20%/30% noise with
enabled or disabled 2nd order ToM capacity, and a static con-
fidence threshold of 0.8. Each of the setups was run 100
times, always with identically configured agents. Simula-
tions ended either when both agents believed to have reached
agreement, or without 2nd order ToM, as soon as the Com-
municator finished its gesture production. As dependent
variables we collected the probability distribution of the at-
tributed you-belief about a gesture’s meaning after every pro-
cessing of a hand trajectory. We were particularly interested
in the effects that different degrees of mentalizing have on
the inter-agent coordination dynamics. The complexity of
the communication depends on inferred communicative in-
tent, signaled via social gaze. As soon as mutual commu-
nicative intent is established, the simulation follows a typical
grounding process with presentation and acceptance phases
(H. H. Clark & Brennan, 1991), where the Communicator al-
ways starts with producing a ‘circle’ gesture.
To examplify the effect of the mental attributions and infer-
ences possible in 1st and 2nd order ToM, Figure 3 illustrates
two typical interaction patterns from our simulation study.
The overt behavior of two agents, a Communicator and a Re-
cipient, are shown along with the inferences drawn after per-
ceiving or producing a certain behavior, with indices referring
to the inference rules as shown in Figure 2.
The interaction at the bottom shows a sequence of behav-
ior and inferences typical for 1st order ToM mentalizing. The
configured desire to communicate triggers rule C1, hence
gaze behavior is perceived by the Recipient (rule R1). Since
the Recipient is equally configured, its reciprocal gaze behav-
ior (rule R2) triggers an inference about the Recipient’s desire
to communicate in the Communicator (rule C2), and conse-
quently a gesture is produced (rule C3).
The interaction at the top shows behavior and inferences
enabled through 2nd order ToM. While in the beginning there
is a similarity to the 1st order ToM interaction, additionally
rules R3 and C4 are triggered and establish the agents’ com-
mon communicative intent and thus the foundation for mean-
ingful coordination behavior. After the initial gesture produc-
tion the Recipient’s mirroring subsystem provides the men-
talizing subsystem with the most likely interpretation for the
Communicator’s behavior. That novel behavior triggers rule
R4, by which the Recipient would ideally produce the under-
stood gesture back to the Communicator, but in this interac-
tion the gesture was understood with a likelihood above the
good-enough threshold. This triggers rule R5 and R9 as well,
leading to a head-nod. Since the Communicator has no idea
what the Recipient has understood the head-nod behavior is
tCommunicator
Recipient Head nod
Head shake Head nod
W
ith
 2
nd
 o
rd
er
 To
M
Gesture 
production Head nod
Gaze Gesture productionC1
C2 & 
C3 & 
C4
Gaze
R1 & 
R2 & 
R3
R4 & 
R5 & 
R9
C7
R8
C5 & 
C8 & 
C9
R6 & 
R9 & 
R10
Communicator
Recipient
Gaze Gesture production
On
ly
 1
st
 o
rd
er
 To
M
C1 C2 & C3
GazeR1 & R2
Figure 3: Example interactions from our simulation when both agents have 2nd order ToM (top) or 1st order ToM (bottom).
Overt behavior is shown along with the triggered mentalizing inferences (gray circles; indices referring to Figure 2).
answered by a head-shake (rule C7), which triggers the Re-
cipient to produce its understood gesture back to the Commu-
nicator (rule R8). The Communicator understands the ges-
ture, which triggers rules equivalent to those in the Recipient
(rule C5, C8, and C9), leading to a head-nod, which is equiv-
alently answered by the Recipient (rule R6, and R9) and fi-
nalizes the interaction through mutually believed agreement
(rule R10).
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Figure 4: Simulations show KL-divergence between agents’
beliefs during interactions of different extent, averaged over
noise and ToM conditions.
To test the agents’ ability to coordinate with and without
2nd order ToM enabled, we analyzed the Kulbach-Leibler
Divergence between the probability distributions of the Re-
cipient’s you-belief and the Communicator’s me-belief, i.e.
the “target belief”. Figure 4 shows the divergence over in-
teraction time. Without 2nd order ToM only one gesture was
produced within 5 seconds. With 2nd order ToM the duration
was strongly dependend on the correct understanding of ob-
served gestures. The more mistakes, due to noise, the more
correction effort emerged and hence longer interactions. Ana-
lyzed were interactions with length of at least 10 seconds and
20 seconds, respectively. These plots show the average suc-
cess of coordination, especially in longer interactions. To test
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Figure 5: Analyses show a) mean differences between noise
conditions after 5 sec., and b) mean differences between final
likelihood about another’s belief in ToM conditions.
the effect of noise we compared the success of both agents
reaching the target belief within last three hand position sam-
ples before the 5 second mark, averaged over ToM conditions
(Figure 5(a)). The comparison shows a significant difference
(t(1198) = 2.4, p< 0.05, d = 0.14) between 10% (M = 0.6,
SD = 0.4) and 30% (M = 0.7, SD = 0.5) noise conditions
on gesture understanding. Subsequently, we tested the in-
fluence of 2nd order ToM, also by analyzing the success of
reaching the target belief (Figure 5(b)). A comparison of the
final beliefs averaged over all noise conditions with 2nd order
ToM (M= 0.9, SD= 0.27) and without (M= 0.7, SD= 0.45)
showed that 2nd order ToM leads to significantly more likely
success in coordination (t(598) = 6.8, p< 0.01, d = 0.56).
Conclusions
In this paper we have investigated the questions how mere ac-
tion observation needs to be complemented by higher order
mentalizing, and how those systems need to interact in order
to account for the dynamic inter-agent coordination mecha-
nisms that are required for successful communication. Our
view is based on the notion that there is a strong difference
in the interaction with intentional, versus non-intentional en-
tities. To that end we augmented a predictive action observa-
tion system with a ‘minimal’ mentalizing model that enables
distinct mental perspectives corresponding to beliefs about
me, you, and we.
Our approach is to explicate possible interactions between
mentalizing and mirroring in terms of computational process
models that can be implemented and tested in actual simu-
lations of dynamic unfolding interactions. Here, we inves-
tigated whether 1st order mental state attributions are suffi-
cient to infer the information necessary to successfully act to-
wards a communicative goal, or whether higher order theory
of mind can give a distinct advantage. Our results demon-
strate that mentalizing affords interactive grounding and thus
makes communication significantly more robust and efficient.
However, even with higher order mentalizing capacities, a too
large perturbation of the communicative signals led to long
interaction times due to the inefficient error correcting mech-
anism emerging from both agents’ goal for successful com-
munication. Still, we established in a first prototypical mod-
eling attempt that mentalizing is crucial for meaningful co-
ordination behavior, and success in communication could not
be established without 2nd order mental state attributes. We
are thus confident that the present framework presents a good
basis for further investigation of social cognitive processes,
which Neuroscience is currently not yet able to elucidate. For
one, we aim to provide an account for how agents dynami-
cally compensate for noise by strategically altering their sig-
naling behavior. Another question to pursue is how self-other
distinctions manifest themselves in the sensorimotor system,
e.g. when observing other agents while performing an action
oneself.
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